1 Introduction
The Value Premium
The origin of the economic literature pertaining to the value premium can be traced back to the classic "Security Analysis" of Graham and Dodd (1934) . They argued that investors regularly undervalued out-of-favor companies by excessively focusing on the earnings track record rather than on the value of the business. Undervalued stocks can be found by comparing the market value of equity with fundamental values such as the book value of equity. Buying stocks that have low prices relative to assets and earnings -while ignoring track recordleads to a significantly better than average performance, thus yielding the value premium. One of the students of Graham and Dodd that has been successful by following this value strategy is Warren Buffett.
Over the years, the value strategy has been investigated extensively in empirical academic studies. In the Journal of Finance alone, Basu (1977) , Thaler (1985, 1987) , Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989) , Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) , and Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) have published results that indicate that the value premium exists and is statistically significant.
In recent years, value strategies continued to attract academic attention. French (1998, 2006) , Chan and Lakonishok (2004) , Petkova and Zhang (2005) , Zhang (2005) , Phalippou (2007) , Mouselli (2010) , Chen, Petkova, and Zhang (2008) , Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010) , Beukes (2011) , and Piotroski and So (2012) not only focus on documenting the value premium across different international markets but increasingly test hypotheses pertaining to the cause of the phenomenon.
Risk based Explanation
Two competing explanations for the existence of the value premium are offered. The riskbased school of thought posits that the outperformance of the value stocks is a function of risk. After correcting for the inherent riskiness of value stocks, the value premium disappears. The risk-based school of thought disagrees on the reason for the inherent riskiness of value stocks. Some believe that value stocks are generally financially distressed (i.e. above average financial leverage); others believe that they have a greater difficulty in adjusting to economic downturns as a result of the "asset-rich" nature of their business model (i.e. above average operational leverage). The most visible proponents of this school of thought are Fama and French (1992 , 1998 ).
Behavioral explanation
Alternatively, the behavioral finance school of thought led by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV) (1994, p. 1542) posit that: "Value strategies might produce higher returns because they are contrarian to 'naive' strategies followed by other investors. These naive strategies might range from extrapolating past earnings growth too far into the future, to assuming a trend in stock prices, to overreacting to good or bad news, or to simply equating a good investment with a well-run company irrespective of price. Regardless of the reason, some investors tend to get overly excited about stocks that have done well in the past and buy them up, so that these 'glamour' stocks become overpriced. Similarly, they overreact to stocks that have done very badly, oversell them, and these out-of-favor 'value' stocks become underpriced. Contrarian investors bet against such naive investors. Because contrarian strategies invest disproportionally in stocks that are underpriced and underinvest in stocks that are overpriced, they outperform the market." By sticking to factual information such as book value per share and not allowing expectations into the decision making process the value investor insulates himself from subjectivity and emotion in making investment decisions.
Real Estate value premium
A number of studies look into the value premium in the case of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs are the most commonly used vehicle to securitize real estate portfolios so as to make them available to investors that prefer the liquidity that is offered by the equity capital markets. For REITs the book value of Equity is nearly always equal to the Net Asset Value. By buying stocks with a high book value compared to the market value an investors effectively buys REITs with a discount to NAV. Value premium in REITs exists when, in the long run, REITs with a discount to NAV (value REITs) outperform REITs with a premium to NAV (Growth REITs).
1.2.1 Indirect Real Estate (REITs) Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) , Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2004) , Lee, Lee, and Chiang (2005) 
Aim of this study
The aim of this study is to measure and explain the value premium for international REITs. We contribute to the existing literature by broadening the scope beyond US REITs and by providing empirical evidence to the cause of the value premium. We expect that the value premium does exist for international REITs similar to US REITs, although our single currency viewpoint (euro) and the corresponding currency risk could influence the result.
Data and Methodology
The empirical research is executed in three phases. First, the returns of value REIT stocks are compared with those of growth REIT stocks in order to establish whether a statistically significant value premium in REIT stocks exists. Next, we measure if the value premium is the commensurate reward for the higher riskiness of value REIT stocks. Finally, we examine whether the value premium is the result of naive extrapolation by investors.
From the Thomson Reuters Datastream database (hereafter "Datastream"), we collect the following data for all REITs (Exhibit 1) that were listed on the stock market of 23 developed countries in the period Q2:1993 -Q2:2013: the stock price, dividends per share, return index, market to book ratio and the market capitalization (MV). If REITs were no longer listed due to bankruptcy, delisting or as a result of take-over (classified as "dead" in Datastream), we included the data pertaining to these REITs for the period that these were actively traded in order to mitigate look-ahead or survivorship bias (Banz and Breen, 1986) . In addition to the data collected for each individual stock, we collected exchange rate data as at 30 June of each year from all non-euro currencies to euro. These exchange rates are used to recalculate market values, prices and returns in local currency to EUR since we take the viewpoint of a European investor.
Exhibit 1 | Developed stock markets and number of REITS initially included in sample.
Note: these regions are nearly similar to the 23 countries used by Kenneth French on his website 2 to establish an international HML portfolio for common stocks. Like Fama and French (1992) we use data as of 30 June of each year since by that date most companies will have published their latest annual reports. We exclude companies for which Datastream does not provide sufficient data. To ensure liquidity we require a minimum average daily trade volume in the month June of EUR 0.5 million. Following Ooi et al. (2007) we only include REITs with a positive B/M multiple, since companies with a negative B/M multiple must have negative book value of Equity and therefore tend to be distressed companies. Exhibit 2 shows the number of REITs for each individual year that meet these criteria.
Exhibit 2 The number of REITs listed on developed stock markets with our criteria has risen substantially from 100 in 1993 to over 400 in 2012 thereby allowing institutional investors a growing universe from which they can build securitized real estate exposure.
In line with Ooi et al. (2007) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (LSV, 1994) we calculate the ratio of book value of equity per share to share price or the Book to Market (B/M) multiple at 30 June of each year. Next, we rank these stocks according to the B/M ratio and assign an equal number of stocks to five groups or quintiles each year. For example, if the universe consists of 100 REITs, we assign the twenty companies with the highest B/M ratio to the value quintile (Q1) and those with the lowest rank in terms of B/M to the growth quintile (Q5 
Returns from value and growth REITs
As the result of the consistent empirical evidence provided for the value premium, it is generally accepted by financial economists that the value premium is a factor that explains the expected return for common stocks. One of the factors in the widely applied three factor model of Fama and French (1992) is HML which denotes the positive relationship between expected stock return and the relative position of the stock in the B/M ranking of all stocks.
To test whether international value REITs also outperform growth REITs, we have calculated total returns in euro for a one-year holding-period, starting directly after portfolio formation. The simple mean one-year holding period returns for Q1 to Q5 as well as the difference between Q1 and Q5 are shown in Exhibit 4. Exhibit 4 shows that the value premium is 10.3 percent on a one year holding period. Value REITs outperform growth REITs at five per cent significance level. The returns are equally weighted mean returns over the sample period. Time series variation is used to calculate the significance level of the difference between Q1 and Q5 returns. The empirical evidence indicates that investors can expect a statistically significant value premium for REITs traded on the developed world's stock markets. Our sample exhibits a positive value premium in 15 out of 20 years therefore the value strategy turns out to be a robust investment strategy.
Next, we investigate whether the risk based (as opposed to the behavioural based) school of thought effectively explains the existence of the value premium.
3.2 Are value REITs riskier? Fama and French (1993) suggest that value premium is the reward that investors receive for accepting higher risk. They argue that value stocks are riskier as a result of a higher susceptibility to financial distress. Fama and French (1993) have formalised this argument by defining the three factor model which implies the expected return for a stock is determined by three risk factors: the beta factor, the HML factor and the SMB factor. In line with previous studies such as Gentry et al. (2004) , Chiang et al. (2004) , Anderson et al. (2005) . Important to note that we have used the factors for the global developed markets since our sample only consists of developed REITs.
In line with Ooi et al. (2007) we use three generally accepted risk measures to test whether the risk explanation is indeed a valid one for international REITs. These three risk measures are the standard deviation (and the related Sharpe and Treynor ratio), the beta from the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model and the factor loadings from the Fama and French three factor model (1993).
Equations (1) and (2) Where R i is the yearly return for our five quintile portfolios, R f is the one-month US T-bill rate taken from Kenneth French's website and R m is an equally weighted market return for four global regions which is also taken from French's website (section International Research Returns). SMB (Small minus Big) and HML (High B/M minus Low B/M) mimicking portfolios are also taken from French's website. The four global developed regions are Japan, Asia (ex Japan), North America and Europe and they comprise almost exactly the developed countries we use 4 . When the risk based explanation holds for international REITs we expect to find higher standard deviations, and higher beta's for our Value portfolios than for our Growth portfolios and similar sharpe and treynor ratio's as well as no significant alpha. Exhibit 5 shows that, although the standard deviation of the annual returns of the value strategy is slightly higher than that of the growth strategy (.259 versus .220), the superior riskadjusted performance of value REITs compared to growth REITS is illustrated by the substantially higher Sharpe and Treynor ratios (.705 and .378 versus .446 and .133 respectively) . Moreover, the CAPM or three factor model indicate that the value strategy is not at all riskier than the growth strategy. The beta found when applying CAPM is .649 for the growth strategy and .499 for the value strategy, also indicating that the value strategy is not riskier at all. Furthermore, according to CAPM the value strategy generates a statistically significant alpha of 16.3 per cent compared to a non-significant alpha of 5.2 per cent for the growth strategy.
When SMB and HML are included as risk factors (Fama and French, 1993) , only the value quintile generates a statistically significant alpha of 12.4 per cent per annum while the returns of the other quintiles do not generate any significant abnormal returns that cannot be explained by risk factors. Moreover, the widely used beta risk factor for the value strategy (.759) is comparable to that of the growth strategy (.775) indicating a similar riskiness of both strategies. At least, these results do not support the risk-based explanation for the existence of the REIT value premium.
Why are value REITs under-priced?
The behavioural finance school of thought led by Lakonishok et al. (1994) offers an alternative explanation for the value premium. According to the behavioural school, the superior returns of value stocks over growth stocks are caused by naive extrapolation by investors of past stock performance. Most investors expect the good track record of growth stocks to continue for an extended period of time. They are willing to pay high prices in order to acquire exposure to such allegedly attractive companies. This frequently causes them to overpay as the inevitable mean reversion of results back to the long-term trend tends to lead to disappointment when growth companies' results are published. Conversely, investors are overly pessimistic about the prospects of value stocks. As the value stocks publish results that exceed consensus estimates, these stocks outperform thus generating the value premium. Ooi et al. (2007) test the behavioural explanation for US REITs by examining the pre-and post-formation returns of value and growth portfolios. They find that value REITs, whose returns have been significantly lower than those of growth REITs in the three years before formation, outperform the growth REITs in all five consecutive years after formation, where the first three years are statistically significant at five per cent level.
We have compared pre and post formation returns similar to Ooi et al. (2007) . Exhibit 6 shows that value REITs generate lower returns than growth REITs in all three years prior to formation and the difference is statistically significant in the last two years. The mean reversion phenomenon as posited by the behavioural school of thought is clearly visible from the post formation returns. Returns of value REITs are superior to those of growth REITs in the first four years after portfolio formation. The outperformance is statistically significant in year one and fades away from year two onwards. This indicates that yearly rebalancing is necessary to consistently earn the value premium. The results presented in exhibit 6 are in line with the behavioural explanation of the value premium. Investors are extrapolating historical performance and thus become pessimistic (optimistic) about the prospects of value (growth) stocks. This explains the underperformance (outperformance) of value (growth) stocks in the period preceding portfolio formation. When value (growth) companies subsequently report their earnings and dividends in the years after portfolio formation, investors are positively (negatively) surprised and positively (negatively) adjust the valuation of value (growth) stocks. This reversal of relative performance (reversion to the mean) explains the value premium.
Another way to determine whether investors indeed are generally susceptible to naive extrapolation of past performance is by examining the growth rates of a fundamental variable such as dividend. Ooi et al. (2007) Exhibit 7 shows that the portfolio of international value REITs has a significantly higher average D/P ratio at formation date (.075 versus .056) and has experienced significantly lower growth rates over the three years before portfolio formation (-15.0 percent versus 4.4 percent). However, in the two years after formation, the tables turn as the value REITs generate a higher dividend growth rate, although not statistically significant. The average annual dividend growth rate of a portfolio of value REITs in the first two years after formation is 6.2 percent higher than that of growth REITs. The yearly dividend growth of value REITs in year one, two and three after formation are also larger than those of growth REITs, although not statistically significant. These figures indicate that pre-formation growth rates for growth REITs are extrapolated too far in the future and in reality turn out to be overrated, where negative past growth rates of Value REITs revert to a long term mean of positive growth rates.
5 For this test the actual growth rate of a quintile portfolio is computed as follows: for each of the five portfolios an investor is assumed to invest a fixed amount (say 1 EUR) in each stock in the first year. In the case of dividend growth, the total dividend earned by each portfolio in each year of the holding period is determined by multiplying the dividend per share of each individual stock by its initial proportional weight in the portfolio. From these dividends the growth rate from year 1 to year 2 or 3 at portfolio level can be calculated. The evidence on the pre-and post-formation development of fundamentals such as dividend growth and stock returns provides support for the behavioural explanation of the value premium of REITs.
Conclusion
REITs listed on the international developed markets offer investors a value premium that is both economically (10.3 per cent per annum) and statistically (5 per cent level) significant, when a one year holding period is applied. This value premium of international REITs can not be explained by a higher risk attached to the value portfolio. Both CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model fail to explain the value premium from a risk perspective. Pre-and postformation performance tests show that investors might extrapolate past performance too far in the future and rely too much on dividend growth from the 3 years prior to formation.
Our results are comparable to those of Ooi et al. (2007) who find a value premium for US REITs of 8.5 per cent for a one-year holding period. When the second or third year after formation is considered Ooi et al. find higher and statistically significant value premiums. This could be caused by the fact that our returns are in euro and from stocks listed on global developed markets and due to the fact that we have extended the period of study to 2013 including the global financial crisis.
The magnitude and significance of the value premium still offers investors enticing possibilities to exploit a profitable investment strategy. In efficient markets, such a profitable investment strategy would attract arbitrage to a level where the strategy would no longer offer sufficient returns to be worthwhile. Why does the value premium continue to exist despite the fact that there is a substantial body of publicly available evidence for the premium? One potential answer to this conundrum could be the institutional arrangements that govern the investment industry. Prices in the developed international stock markets are dominantly determined by institutional investors like pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. These investors traditionally manage sizeable equity portfolios and are expected to outperform stock market indices supplied by institutions like MSCI and FTSE. In order to beat the market benchmark the institutional investors stay as closely as possible to the benchmark by overweighting stocks that have been winners in the recent past. If these past winners continue to outperform the market they have reached their goal, but if these popular stocks prove to be a disappointment, the investor will refer to the fact that most other investors (would) have chosen them too. In other words, investors have no incentive to take the risk of investing in unpopular companies with recent poor performance as opposed to following the herd of competing investors by investing in well known blue chips with superior past performance. As long as the short-term performance measurement determines the investors' career prospects, the value premium will perpetuate.
Further research might include international direct real estate investments as suggested by Addae et al. (2013) for US and Asian Pacific cities.
